The Continuity Strategy, Human Behavior, and Behavior Analysis by Dymond, Simon et al.
The Psychological Record, 2003, 53, 333-347 
THE CONTINUITY STRATEGY, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 
AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
SIMON DYMOND 
APU, Cambridge 
BRYAN ROCHE and DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
In behavior analysis, continuity refers to the assumption of a 
similarity of behavioral principles or processes between 
nonhumans and humans, which is often considered to be a 
fundamental postulate of the field. The present paper outlines a 
more recent view of the continuity assumption as an 
epistemological tool or research strategy. Researchers employing 
this strategy attempt to replicate with humans already-identified 
behavioral principles from nonhuman research prior to their 
application to socially relevant issues in natural settings. This form 
of the continuity strategy has flourished, despite demonstrable 
differences between nonhuman and human behavior, firstly in the 
study of performance on schedules of reinforcement and more 
recently in the study of derived stimulus relations. The implications 
of research on derived stimulus relations for the differing 
theoretical accounts of the continuity strategy are discussed. 
The term "continuity" is derived from the French, continuite, and the 
Latin, contuitas-tatis, for continuous. Dictionary definitions refer to "the 
state of being continuous," "an unbroken succession," or "a logical 
sequence." Thus, continuity is used to describe a sequence of related 
events or phenomena. In behavior analysis, the term is typically used in 
a nontechnical manner to refer to the assumption of a similarity of 
psychological principles between nonhumans and humans. Indeed, this 
assumption might be considered a cornerstone of the behavior-analytic 
approach to science. According to Skinner (1953): 
Human behavior is distinguished by its complexity, its variety, and 
its greater accomplishments, but the basic processes [shared with 
nonhumansj are not therefore necessarily different. Science 
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advances from the simple to the complex; it is constantly 
concerned with whether the processes and laws discovered at one 
stage are adequate for the next. It would be rash to assert at this 
point that there is no essential difference between human behavior 
and the behavior of lower species; but until an attempt has been 
made to deal with both in the same terms, it would be equally rash 
to assert that there is. (p. 38) 
The assumption of continuity between nonhumans and humans has 
guided and continues to guide the research activity of behavior analysts 
despite there being little evolutionary justification for such an assumption. 
The evolutionarily sensible form of continuity holds that "new contains old" 
and thus it can not be assumed that "old contains new." Evolutionary theory 
would be rendered absurd if this were the case because evolutionary 
continuity flows forward in time, not backward. Metaphorically, studying 
distantly related species is akin to viewing the tips of evolutionary branches, 
not the rungs of a single evolutionary ladder. As such, evolution progresses 
outward, from the pOint at which different species differentiated, to the 
present containing features of both new and old. In this way, discontinuity 
between humans and nonhumans would in no way contradict a biologically 
sensible form of the continuity assumption (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001 a, p. 145). Indeed, although biological continuity provided the 
inspiration for the evolutionary postulation of psychological continuity 
between species, it does not itself depend on the assumptions of evolution 
for justification. Thus, biological continuity would assume no difference 
between species, pending empirical evidence to the contrary. We will return 
to this issue in greater detail. The important point here is that uncertainty and 
disagreement over the precise nature and status of the continuity 
assumption may have contributed to possible confusion within the field. In 
addition, recent empirical and conceptual advances in the analysis of 
derived relational responding suggest that a fresh look at the issue of 
continuity may be warranted. 
The present paper will first outline the traditional behavior-analytic 
view of nonhuman-human 1 continuity and highlight its pragmatic research 
features. Next, we will summarize the predominant use of the continuity 
assumption in research on basic tasks such as schedules of 
reinforcement and discuss the role it has played in recent discussions of 
nonhuman-human differences. Then, we will explore the possibility that 
behavioral principles different from those already discovered in research 
with nonhumans may be needed to explain complex human behavior, 
most notably in the experimental analysis of verbal behavior and derived 
stimulus relations. Finally, we will conclude with a pragmatic view of the 
future of the continuity assumption. 
1Consistent with Dess and Chapman's (1998) suggested usage, we will use the terms 
human and nonhuman throughout the present article. 
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Behavior Analysis and The Continuity Assumption 
In "The Descent of Man," Charles Darwin proclaimed that "there is no 
fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their 
mental faculties" (Darwin, 1871, p. 446), thereby establishing continuity 
between nonhumans and humans. Darwin's followers further emphasized 
this assertion. For instance, Romanes provided anecdotal material that 
displayed instances of purposive action and intelligence on the part of 
animals, and Morgan suggested his canon of parsimony (Boring, 1929). 
The assumption of continuity between humans and non humans can be 
attributed, in large part, to the endeavors of these founders of 
comparative psychology, that being, the division of psychology concerned 
with comparisons of different species (Alcock, 1998; Hodos & Campbell, 
1969). As the founder of the American pragmatic tradition known as 
functionalism, William James (1890) further declared the similarities 
between humans and non humans: 
Although our treatment must be hypothetical, this does not prevent 
it from being continuous. The point which as evolutionists we are 
bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of being that make 
their appearance are really nothing more than results of the 
redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. (p. 146) 
James pronounced his awe for the continuity assumption: "So strong 
a postulate is continuity! ... The demand for continuity has, over large 
tracts of science, proved itself to possess true prophetic power" (James, 
1890, p. 148). The historical development of behavior analysis can be 
traced through these foregoing influences. Specifically, functionalism, 
with its emphasis on behavior-environment relationships, the philosophy 
of pragmatism, with its rejection of a correspondence-based theory of 
truth, and evolutionary biology, all assumed a continuity of behavioral 
processes across species without denying the possibility of principles 
unique to humans (Boakes, 1984; Lattal, 2001; Morris, 1993). 
Accordingly, the study of nonhuman behavior was intended to elucidate 
behavioral differences with distantly related species such as humans. 
In behavior analysis, the current approach to continuity emphasizes 
similarities between species by using "a few convenient species to study 
aspects of human behavior that are not amenable to experimental study 
for ethical and other reasons." (Harrison, 1994, p. 210, italics added). 
Skinner (1938) also approached the use of nonhumans in behavioral 
research as a matter of convenience: 
In the broadest sense a science of behavior should be concerned 
with all kinds of organisms, but it is reasonable to limit oneself, at 
least in the beginning, to a single representative example. 
Through a certain anthropocentricity of interests we are likely to 
choose an organism that is as similar to man as is consistent with 
experimental convenience and control. (p. 47) 
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Additional pragmatic factors such as the low cost of care and housing 
(Skinner, 1938, pp. 47-48; 1953, p. 38) made rats the "representative 
animal" (Harrison, 1994) for behavior-analytic research. Other rodents, 
pigeons, and primates were later employed as subjects as a means of 
establishing processes common to all species. 
Traditionally, nonhuman research was predicated on the central 
assumption that a continuity of basic behavioral processes exists 
between non humans and humans (Branch & Hackenberg, 1998). 
Research with nonhumans was intended to identify general principles of 
behavior applicable to all species. It was reasoned that by beginning with 
controlled experimental investigations of nonhuman behavior it should be 
possible to extrapolate to more complex human behavior (e.g., Skinner, 
1938, 1953). According to Hodos and Campbell (1969), for instance, 
studying distantly related species is "very useful in formulating 
generalizations about behavioral adaptations to specific problems of 
survival. Such generalizations might have broad applicability to a number 
of lineages of the phylogenetic tree and would greatly aid in the 
interpretation of data obtained through the phylogenetiC approach" (p. 
347). Indeed, the assumption of continuity has been supported well to 
date in the identification of our entire battery of behavioral principles. 
Reinforcement, punishment, generalization, discrimination, extinction, 
recovery, habituation, and so on, have all been demonstrated extensively 
with both human and nonhuman populations. Those that adhere to the 
continuity assumption expect to find, therefore, that all other behavioral 
principles identified with nonhumans will also be applicable to humans. 
Behavior analysts such as Skinner were clear from the outset that 
they were not interested in nonhuman behavior per se, but rather in what 
it could tell us about human behavior (e.g., Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950, p. 
2; Skinner, 1938, pp. 441-442; 1953, p. 38). Assuming continuity between 
the behavior of non humans and humans readily allows for the 
identification of genuine species differences, should they exist, and thus 
"it is only by studying the behavior of lower animals that we can tell what 
§ distinctly human" (Skinner, 1969, p. 101). However, to many outside the 
field, nonhumans were simply not older versions of humans and similarity 
of psychological processes between species could not be assumed nor 
could innate physiological differences be denied (Hayes, 1987). Skinner 
(1938) was patently aware, however, that the continuity strategy mayor 
may not payoff. In his own words: 
Whether or not extrapolation (from the behavior of the rat) is 
justified cannot at present be decided. It is possible that there are 
properties of human behavior which will require a different kind of 
treatment. (p. 442) 
This early Skinnerian view involves treating continuity not as a 
fundamental postulate but as an epistemological tool or research strategy 
(Hayes, 1987; Hayes et aI., 2001a; Hayes & Hayes, 1992). The key issue 
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from this perspective, then, is not whether specific similarities or 
differences really exist between species, but whether a working 
assumption of continuity of behavioral processes will lead to greater 
prediction and influence of human behavior. This form of the continuity 
strategy is both pragmatic and parsimonious in that it provides a 
convenient starting point for a science of behavior without ruling out the 
possibility of revealing differences in the analysis of human behavior. 
Importantly, however, because it is not a fundamental philosophical tenet 
of behaviorism, the continuity strategy could be abandoned immediately 
without jeopardizing the experimental analysis of behavior. 
Although not essential to behavior analysis, the continuity 
assumption has turned out to be a remarkably effective strategy of 
immense practical benefit to the field. The basic principles of 
reinforcement, punishment, and discrimination have been demonstrated 
using virtually every mammalian and avian species and have been further 
replicated with a variety of invertebrate species. Early work with humans 
(e.g., Ayllon & Michael, 1959; Fuller, 1949; Lindsley, 1960) provided 
further empirical support for continuity, whereas many of the techniques 
and procedures used in applied behavior analysis today were originally 
derived, in large part, from research with nonhumans (Mace, 1994; 
Miltenberger, 2001). It seems, therefore, that assuming continuity has 
allowed researchers to develop a number of basic behavioral principles 
and to examine the applicability of those principles to the prediction and 
control of human behavior in laboratories and real-world settings. In fact, 
the success of the continuity assumption may help to explain why it is so 
highly valued within the behavioral tradition. However, not all behavioral 
researchers are willing to swear allegiance to the flag of continuity, and in 
some cases this useful strategic assumption has become the target of 
different research programs designed to support or undermine its 
credibility, and it is to this issue we now turn. 
Applying and Misapplying the Continuity Research Strategy 
One way in which the continuity strategy has been targeted is in 
comparing human behavior with the benchmark of nonhuman behavior 
by undertaking procedural comparisons (Perone, Galizio, & Baron, 1988). 
From this perspective, basic research with humans is intended to confirm 
the relevance and replicability of behavioral principles already identified 
in nonhuman research prior to their application to issues of social 
significance in natural settings. Researchers concerned with this issue, 
most notably in the study of human operant performance on schedules of 
reinforcement, often describe human behavior as being "sensitive" to the 
programmed contingencies when performance resembles that of 
nonhumans under similar contingencies (e.g., Navarick, Bernstein, & 
Fantino, 1990). Human analogs of nonhuman operant chambers and 
other procedural comparisons, including providing food reinforcement, 
have been employed by researchers attempting to make contingencies 
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structurally and functionally similar across species. In the light of recent 
research, however, this extreme form of the continuity strategy has led to 
a degree of conceptual confusion in both accounting for species 
differences in behavior and in defining exactly what a "difference" entails. 
For instance, Madden, Chase, and Joyce (1998) provide a cogent review 
of the difficulties inherent in undertaking between-species comparisons of 
performance on schedules of reinforcement and the confusion that 
results when using the term sensitivity to describe behavior. They outline 
the following three difficulties with between-species comparisons. 
First, using nonhuman behavior as a benchmark for human behavior 
relies upon the assumption that the schedule performance of nonhumans 
in some way represents "schedule-typical" behavior. However, different 
nonhuman species have shown different response patterns on fixed-
interval (FI) schedules (Ferster & Skinner, 1957, p. 157) and performance 
differences along other measures (Perone et aI., 1988). Taken together, 
this suggests that the fixed-interval scallop may not be as characteristic 
of FI nonhuman behavior as was previously assumed (Hyten & Madden, 
1993; Perone et aI., 1988), but also that using any definition of typical 
nonhuman behavior as a benchmark for between-species comparisons is 
likely to be unfounded and lead to further confusion. Second, behavior is 
not always consistent between nonhuman species. Any differences 
between same or different species do not permit general conclusions to 
be made about the sensitivity or nonsensitivity of human behavior (Baron, 
Perone, & Galizio, 1991; Perone et aI., 1988). Finally, by making 
between-species comparisons one is assuming that "procedures 
employed with humans and non humans that are structurally similar 
across species will be functionally similar as well. According to this logic, 
all experimental procedures that resemble those controlling nonhuman 
behavior must also control human behavior in the same manner. This 
conclusion, however, ignores the possibility that procedures that are 
structurally similar across experiments may produce functional 
differences across species" (Madden et aI., 1998, p. 5). Importantly, this 
conclusion poses a challenge to the traditional assumptions of continuity 
by drawing attention to the role played by possible procedural differences 
in accounting for between-species discrepancies. According to Branch 
and Hackenberg (1998), "it is important to study human and nonhuman 
behavior under circumstances as similar as possible. Otherwise, 
differences in performance may be mistakenly attributed to human verbal 
functioning or some species-typical characteristic, when they are actually 
the result of more mundane differences in procedure." (p. 27). In this way, 
an extreme form of the continuity strategy is preserved by clutching onto 
the battery of existing behavioral principles and then seeking to 
determine how, procedurally, they apply to human behavior. 
This cautious stance has flourished despite research frequently 
demonstrating differences between nonhuman and human behavior 
using structurally and functionally similar contingenCies and 
environmental contexts. These near-ubiquitous findings have led some 
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researchers to propose that different behavioral principles might be 
needed to account for differences in nonhuman and human behavior 
(e.g., Lowe, 1979, 1983), thereby abandoning the continuity strategy. 
Based on the findings of research on reinforcement schedules, Lowe 
sought to explain human and nonhuman differences on FI and other 
schedules, not by speculating on the ways in which the behavioral 
principles worked with humans or the possible influence of procedural 
factors, but by postulating that new principles must exist for human 
behavior. Thus, it seems that the extreme form of the continuity strategy 
has led some human operant researchers to abandon it entirely. The 
success of the strategy, at least to Lowe (1979), has been its downfall. 
But what is the alternative? 
Whereas the past 80 years of behavior-analytic research has 
supported the continuity view, recently the assumption of anti-continuity 
has gained momentum, particularly in the experimental analysis of 
human verbal behavior. Species differences are typically explained in 
terms of the effect of verbal behavior on human performance; the so-
called "language hypothesis" (ct. Barnes, 1989; Lowe, 1979). For many, 
the language hypothesis made the study of human verbal behavior 
essential in its own right (e.g., Hayes, Blackledge, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2001; Hayes & Hayes, 1992). Indeed, it could be argued that the 
continuity strategy has in fact been misapplied within the context of 
human operant research. The strategy provided a useful assumption 
underpinning the use of nonhumans in the behavioral laboratory, but the 
strategy was never meant to be, at least within behavior analysis, the key 
focus of the research agenda. However, when human participants 
demonstrated response patterns on schedules of reinforcement that 
differed from nonhumans, the battle lines were quickly drawn between the 
continuity strategists and proponents of the language hypothesis. The 
former sought to demonstrate that procedural variables alone could 
explain the behavioral differences, whereas the latter looked to the 
development of human language as the important source underlying the 
differing behavioral outcomes across human and nonhuman species. 
We would argue that this empirical concern with the continuity 
strategy was unfortunate because it served to distract behavioral 
researchers from the systematic study of human behavior in its own right 
(Barnes, 1989; Hayes & Hayes, 1989). Rather than creating a rich and 
varied program of behavior-analytic research on human behavior, many 
of the studies focused instead on demonstrating that humans produced 
schedule performances that were either similar or dissimilar to 
nonhumans (e.g., Baron et aI., 1991; Lowe, 1979; Lowe, Beasty, & 
Bentall, 1983; Lowe, Harzem & Bagshaw, 1978; Perone et aI., 1988). 
Despite over two decades of research, this issue remains largely 
unresolved within the context of schedule research, and one now rarely 
sees an article on human reinforcement schedule performance that 
attempts to deal directly with the issue of continuity. 
Unfortunately, however, the battle between the respective proponents of 
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the continuity strategy and the language hypothesis continues to this day, 
but the theater of controversy is now provided through the study of 
equivalence and other derived stimulus relations rather than through the 
study of reinforcement schedules. In the remainder of this article we will 
briefly examine the study of derived stimulus relations, and three different 
theoretical approaches that have emerged within this domain. Two of these 
approaches clearly stand on opposite sides of the continuity fence, whereas 
the third self-consciously attempts to avoid the debate, focusing instead on 
the study of human behavior as an important research topic in its own right. 
Derived Relational Responding and the Continuity Strategy 
Over the past 30 years, behavior analysts have devoted considerable 
research attention to the phenomenon of derived stimulus relations that 
appear to provide the foundations for a modern behavioral account of 
verbal behavior. The basic finding is as follows. Suppose, for instance, 
reinforcement is delivered for selection of the following arbitrary stimuli on 
separate trials: B in the presence of stimulus A, and C in the presence of 
stimulus B. Most verbally able humans will now readily reverse these 
explicitly reinforced conditional discriminations in the absence of further 
training. That is, they will now select A given B, and B given C in 
accordance with derived symmetrical, or mutually entailed, stimulus 
relations. Furthermore, subjects will now also select C given A and A 
given C in accordance with derived transitive and equivalence, or 
combinatorially entailed, stimulus relations without further training. 
Following such derived performances, the stimuli are said to partiCipate 
in an equivalence class (Sidman, 1994) or a relational frame of 
equivalence (Barnes, 1994; Hayes, 1991). Perhaps what is most 
interesting about derived stimulus relations such as equivalence is that 
the outcomes are not readily predicted from the traditional concept of 
conditional discrimination; neither A nor C has a direct history of 
differential reinforcement with regard to the other, and therefore neither 
stimulus should control selection of the other. Similarly, the processes 
responsible for these outcomes can not be based upon stimulus 
generalization because the stimuli have no formal properties in common. 
Another feature of derived stimulus relations is the transformation of 
stimulus functions among related stimuli. The transformation of stimulus 
functions is said to occur when the function of one stimulus in a derived 
relation alters or transforms the functions of another according to the 
derived relation between the two, without additional training. Derived 
stimulus functions have been demonstrated with children, adults, and 
individuals with developmental disabilities using discriminative, 
consequential, and respondent eliciting, extinction, and avoidance 
functions (for a review see Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). Such findings are 
important because they make derived relational responding relevant to 
psychology in general and because the transformation of arbitrary 
relational functions can lead to other forms of responding. Indeed, it has 
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been argued that the transformation of functions may provide a 
contemporary behavior-analytic account of the processes through which 
stimuli come to acquire novel functions, both adaptive and abbe rant, via 
verbal processes (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001; 
Friman, Hayes, & Wilson, 1998; Roche & Barnes, 1997; Wilson & Hayes, 
2000). For many behavior analysts, it is now possible to define verbal 
events in terms of derived stimulus functions and thus build upon 
Skinner's (1957) account of verbal behavior in accounting for the 
generative and referential nature of human language (see, for example, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000). 
Derived Relational Responding and Species Differences 
Derived stimulus relations appear to have many implications for 
providing a functional analysis of human language and cognition. One of the 
main empirical reasons why the phenomenon of derived stimulus relations 
has been implicated in the analysis of human language and cognition is the 
unrelenting difficulty researchers have experienced in demonstrating it with 
nonhuman species, including higher primates (e.g., Dugdale & Lowe, 2000; 
Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby, & Carrigan, 1982; but see L. J. 
Hayes, 1992; Kastak, Schusterman, & Kastak, 2001; Schusterman & 
Kastak, 1993). The relative ease with which derived stimulus relations 
emerge for humans compared with the difficulty reported in obtaining similar 
results from nonhuman experiments, even following extensive training (e.g., 
Dube, Mcllvane, Callahan, & Stoddard, 1993; Dugdale & Lowe, 2000; 
Hayes, 1989; Upkens, Kop, & Matthijs, 1988), has been seen by some as 
threatening the continuity strategy, at least within the behavior-analytic 
tradition. As indicated previously, this threat to the continuity strategy 
appears to have generated three different theoretical positions within the 
study of derived stimulus relations, reflecting pro-continuity, anti-continuity, 
and an agnostic stance. We will briefly consider each of these in turn. 
The pro-continuity position is best reflected in theoretical work of 
Sidman (1994, 2000) and his colleagues (e.g., Mcllvane, Serna, Dube, & 
Stromer, 2000). These researchers have argued explicitly that equivalence 
class formation, and perhaps other forms of derived relational responding, 
are basic stimulus functions that "fall out of" the reinforcement 
contingencies. Not unlike the pro-continuity schedule researchers from the 
1970s and 1980s, Sidman and colleagues argue that the many failures to 
show derived stimulus relations with nonhumans is likely due to procedural 
problems that have not yet been corrected in any nonhuman study (see 
Mcllvane et aI., 2000, for a detailed discussion of this issue). 
The anti-continuity position is best reflected in the "naming" account of 
equivalence, which argues that an individual's naming skills are necessary 
and may be sufficient for passing tests of emergent relations and hence 
nonhumans that lack such naming skills will fail to demonstrate equivalence 
(Horne & Lowe, 1996). The fact that non humans have yet to convincingly 
show derived relational responding is often cited as evidence for this 
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position. Indeed, Horne and Lowe (1996) go so far as to suggest that even 
if a nonhuman species were to pass, unequivocally, tests for equivalence 
then such results would not aid our understanding of human behavior as the 
processes involved would necessarily be contingency-shaped and not 
verbally governed (p. 224). This explanation of species differences 
presupposes the existence of additional behavioral principles in human 
behavior and explicitly abandons the gains of the continuity strategy, 
replacing it with ill-defined, "language-centric" terms (see Barnes, 1996; 
Stromer, Mackay, & Remington, 1996). 
The agnostic position, with respect to the continuity assumption, is 
clearly reflected in Relational Frame Theory2 (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Roche, 2001 b). This theoretical position considers equivalence and other 
derived stimulus relations to be learned behavior, or more specifically a new 
type of generalized relational operant. According to this view, relational 
operants themselves can become generalized to a wide variety of stimulus 
and response events, in a broadly similar way as occurs in generalized 
imitation (see Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000). The operant 
process of relational framing is new insofar as it can affect how all other 
behavioral processes work (Hayes et ai, 2001 b). An explicitly reinforced 
punisher, for example, can be transformed almost instantly into a reinforcer 
if it comes to participate in a derived stimulus relation of opposition with 
punishment (e.g., as when a child is told during a game that "good means 
bad and bad means good"). Although RFT argues that a new behavioral 
process is involved in derived relational responding, RFT remains agnostic 
with respect to the continuity assumption in that it does "not need to take the 
stand that nonhumans will never show derived stimulus relations." (Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001 a, p. 145). In short, there mayor may not be 
continuity in terms of derived relational responding from nonhuman to 
human, but in and of itself this issue is relatively unimportant for RFT. 
Nonetheless, questions concerning nonhuman-human continuity can 
emerge from RFT. For example, one might ask, is there a level of derived 
relational responding that nonhumans can not reach? Intuitively, some 
limit on nonhuman derived relational responding seems almost certain, 
but discovering this limit is not a key focus for the theory. And in any case, 
it would be a quantitative limit on the behavioral process of relational 
framing, not evidence for a new process specific to humans. With that 
said, work with nonhumans may well be critical in disentangling the 
behavioral histories involved in establishing and manipulating relational 
framing as an operant behavior. In fact, the well-known study by 
Schusterman and Kastak (1993), in which multiple-exemplar training was 
used to establish equivalence responding in a sea lion, provides strong 
evidence to support the RFT interpretation of stimulus equivalence as a 
generalized operant response class. 
2Relational frame theory is but one example of a research area in behavior analysis 
that remains agnostic with respect to the continuity assumption. The study of rule-governed 
behavior, for instance, could also be characterized in this way. However, we have focused 
on RFT for present purposes because it is very clearly and explicitly agnostic on the 
continuity issue (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001 a, p. 145). 
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In the final analysis, RFT assumes that the behavioral differences 
between nonhumans and humans will largely be quantitative in nature. 
An important task for RFT is to predict and control this quantitative 
difference by exploring the reinforcement histories that give rise to 
complex human behavior. Nonhuman research is one way in which this 
can be undertaken. For instance, how much training is necessary and 
with how many different stimulus combinations, before relational 
responding becomes abstracted and generalizes to novel stimulus sets? 
These and other empirical issues can, and should, be examined with both 
nonhumans and humans (for examples of this approach see, Giurfa, 
Zhang, Jenett, Menzel, & Srinivasan, 2001; Kastak et aI., 2001; Zentall, 
1998; Zentall & Urcuoli, 1993). Although nonhumans have yet to 
demonstrate, unequivocally, derived relational responding, studying the 
extent to which nonhuman and human behavior differs should help to 
identify both the reinforcement history necessary to establish the desired 
performance and highlight the advantages of studying human behavior 
on its own terms (Hayes, Blackledge, et aI., 2001). The continuity strategy 
will provide a possibly useful backdrop for this work, but it will not be the 
key focus of the research activity. In this way, RFT removes itself from the 
Pro- and anti-continuity battle, and turns instead to the analysis of human 
behavior in its own right, employing humans, non humans, and even 
computational models (e.g., Barnes & Hampson, 1997), in its quest to 
provide a modern behavioral understanding of human language and 
cognition. 
Conclusion 
The strategic nature of the continuity assumption can encourage 
researchers to investigate human behavior in its own right, but it can also 
encourage research that seems entirely focused on proving or disproving 
the assumption. We are not convinced that this latter approach has been 
particularly productive or progressive as a research strategy. Quantifying 
human-nonhuman differences necessitates that we look beyond the 
traditional behavioral explanation of "enormous differences in complexity" 
(Skinner, 1938, p. 442) and undertake, for example, further empirical and 
conceptual analyses of derived relational responding. If human behavior, 
and language and cognition in particular, can not be understood in terms 
of processes that are also observed in nonhuman behavior, then it means 
simply that processes emerged in one evolutionary branch and not 
another. Behavior analysis, as an approach to psychology, will not stand 
or fall on this issue. In fact, the continuity strategy was never meant to be 
the key focus of any behavior-analytic research agenda, and as such we 
should not target this strategy as one of our main concerns in the study 
of human behavior. We believe that there are just too many other more 
important issues to be addressed in the study of human psychology. 
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